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THE THEORY OF FEDERALISM. 
THE FEATURES OF THE FEDERAL 
ORDER OF THE STATE
Any considerations on the theory of federalism should state at the very outset that there is no single pattern of federalism to which one could appeal. It is impossi-
ble to construct a single model of federalism which might, in turn, be regarded as the 
ideal type, which could then serve as a yardstick when it comes to examining each 
individual case that relates to a federal system.
However, we cannot completely reject attempts to establish such a model in our 
research on federal systems.1 It should be noted that there is a vast catalogue of ideas 
and institutions that are constitutive of federal principles in political systems, albeit 
not all of these elements can necessarily be implemented in every federal state. This 
catalogue will always remain broader than the catalogue of institutions and federal 
ideas which is characteristic of particular states. One encounters very early on a re-
search problem when it comes to determining which ideas and institutions are essen-
tial in order for us to be able to speak in terms of a federal regime, and how many of 
them should be implemented within it.
Another observation relates to their actual application in governmental prac-
tices, because – as we can easily learn from history – the letter of law is not always 
compatible with governmental practices. This qualification is in no way restricted 
to undemocratic regimes. The tendency towards centralization is more frequent 
and is constantly increasing, which in turn explains why even in federal demo-
cratic states the federal principle is being weakened and impeded by the central 
government.
1 Such approach is presented, for example, by W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, Warszawa 1968, 
p. 79.
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1. THE USES OF THE TERM
In discussing the issues connected to a political system within a federal state various 
terms can be used in order to illustrate their character or to grasp the phenomenon 
itself. Despite the fact that they sometimes seem to be synonymous there are some 
differences between them. Below we present some of the basic issues concerning the 
terms used in describing the phenomena in question.
1.1. Federalism and federation
The two terms are strictly linked with one another. Both are derived from the Latin 
term foedus, which means relationship or covenant. There is no single and universal-
ly accepted scientific definition of these phenomena. The proximity of these terms 
is apparent in that they must be used to explain one another – something that may 
raise objections – but they simply cannot be severed.
Federalism is a relatively new term and was introduced into the language in the 
nineteenth century.2 Federalism may be referred to as the theoretical basis of a fed-
eration. It is a set of principles that determine the organization, functions, and deci-
sion-making process of a federation. A federation, or a federal state, is a set of legal 
and governmental institutions which enable us to distinguish a particular state from 
both unitary states and confederations.3 Federalism is according to Suchecki ‘a dy-
namic which develops various forms of federal state.’4 Thus federalism is both an idea 
and a process while a federation is the manifestation of these ideas and is subjected 
to the process mentioned above. It is worth mentioning that federalism as a theory 
of a phenomenon relates not only to the federal state but also to other subjects where 
we have to deal with a specific type of competence-sharing between the respective 
units of a particular community.
The popular understanding of the concept of federalism links this term with 
some kind of territorial structure. It ought to be remembered that the territorial di-
visions within a state do not definitely settle the question concerning its structure 
or character of government. With regard to this point other factors are essential, in-
cluding the division of powers between the respective branches of government. The 
issues concerning federal states are particularly affected by terminological difficulties. 
Federal states, also known as union states or simply federations, are comprised of 
smaller units called member states, lands, länder and counties, or depending on the 
state – lands, cantons and states. From the perspective of a political system the actual 
terminological issue is not particularly important.
2 P. Czarny, Bundesrat. Między niemiecką tradycją a europejską przyszłością, Warszawa 2000, p. 7.
3 W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, p. 94.
4 Ibid.
This content downloaded from 
            149.156.234.28 on Fri, 16 Oct 2020 10:46:31 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
417POLITEJA 2/1(10/1)/2008 The Theory of Federalism…
1.2. Confederation and federation
Confederation is one of the forms of government that is based on the federal prin-
ciple. Confederation is the ‘elder sister’ of federation. The process of turning a con-
federation into a federation is intellectual interesting, as well as identifying when 
this process might be considered to have been completed. In order to answer this 
question one must shed some light on the meaning of this term. According to the 
definition proposed by Sczaniecki, ‘confederation, or a union of states, consists of 
sovereign states joined together in order to deal with some general, strictly defined 
and limited common aims.’5
Suchecki points out: ‘The differences [between a federation and a confedera-
tion] are both of a quantitative and qualitative character, and differ in regard to 
the extent of their application in particular fields.’6The first difference relates to 
the origin of both forms. It is commonly held that a confederation originates as 
an international agreement made between sovereign states, while a federation is 
based on the rules of domestic law. The other difference lies in the character of the 
union. A confederation is not a separate and self-dependant state, while a federa-
tion definitely is. From this fact springs another difference when it comes to the 
issue of sovereignty. A confederation does not posses sovereignty; it belongs only 
to the entities which agreed the union. In contrast, in a federation, sovereignty, 
depending on the approach and the theory, belongs to the entities that create the 
union, as well as to the federation itself.7 The problem of durability of both forms 
is also a subject of research. According to the definition mentioned above, a con-
federation constitutes a union that has been established in order to attain concrete 
goals, and after having fulfilled them it should, in theory, be liquidated. In con-
trast, a federation is a permanent union. Some other differences become apparent 
when we take into account legal regulations within both political forms. It con-
cerns not only the process of enacting and implementing various laws, but also the 
character of relations between the branches of the constituent units belonging to 
the union and the branches of the federal government. Generally speaking, a con-
federation may be regarded as being a less coherent entity due to the fact that it 
has no power to impose its own laws and political will on the constituent states. 
The nature of the confederation’s policies and whether, indeed, they will in fact be 
implemented, is entirely dependant upon the will of the constituent states and the 
choices that they make. It should be emphasized that the decision-making process 
within a confederation should be conducted unanimously. This latter condition is 
a distinctive feature of a confederation in comparison to a federation. In a federa-
5 M. Sczaniecki, Powszechna historia państwa i prawa, Warszawa 1997, p. 520.
6 W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, p. 99.
7 The issue of sovereignty in a federal state has raised controversy since the very emergence of such 
states. These issues are discussed more fully in the following part of this article.
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tion, in order for a decisions to be legally binding, a majority of votes is needed, or 
sometimes a qualitative majority.8
The above mentioned features concerning the character of a confederation and 
a federation have rarely occurred in their pure forms. During the process of shifting 
from loose international co-operation towards some more binding forms of linkage, 
including a federal state, the various elements have been mixed and only a case study 
would allow us to determine the character of a particular union. It is no accident that 
confederation used to be called a union of states while a federation was a union state.
1.3. Federalism and centralization
In discussing matters concerning federalism and the federal state we cannot avoid 
mentioning the issue of the centralization of governmental power. Federalism, or ra-
ther federalization, as has been already acknowledged, is a process which aims to ‘find 
a compromise between a particular interest and the interest of the whole.’9 In order 
for this aim to be achieved it is necessary to establish the appropriate institutions 
which would guarantee to respect the rights of the constituents, and recognize that 
they have their own interests, and would guarantee the participation of these consti-
tuents in the decision-making process in matters that pertained to them. Centralism 
and centralization is a process quite contrary to the principles of federalism. Through 
this process the central government seeks to secure as many entitlments as possible 
and to gain control over other units that posses legal powers.
Federalism is represented by a federal state and centralization by a centralized 
state.10 While on the face of it, these two concepts seem to contradict one another, 
they do not in fact completely exclude each other, and, moreover, they are tightly 
connected. As soon as federal states emerged, and even before that time, there has 
been a struggle between two conceptions: the federalist, which aims to share powers 
between two levels of the state, and the centralist, which tries to secure a dominant 
position within the federation for the central government. In most cases a compro-
mise has proved to be workable. The constitutions of federal states may serve as the 
best example of such compromises, especially when we examine in detail the projects 
presented earlier by both sides.11 However, the passing of a constitution usually does 
not bring the argument between federalists and centralists to an end; it usually only 
moves it up to another level.
8 For more information about differences between federation and confederation, see W. Suchecki, 
Teoria federalizmu, pp. 100-114.
9 Ibid., p. 94.
10 I choose not to use the term ‘unitary state’ because when discussing the process of centralization, 
I relate this phenomenon to the sates that possess complex structures. The very structure of the 
state, whether it has a federal or unitary character, does not decide whether the former corresponds 
with a decentralized model and the latter with a centralized model.
11 For example, see the constitution of Switzerland from 1848 or the Austrian constitution from 
1920.
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As noted above, the constitution very often cannot determine the exact nature of 
the division of powers. Contemporary federal governments and agencies are particu-
larly prone to acquiring competences reserved for their constituents. It is often done 
without the consent of the latter. The financial dependence of the constituents on 
federal aid represents another form of centralization.
2. FEDERAL PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
Now we will enumerate the principles and institutions that are characteristic of fe-
deral political systems. Federal principles and institutions can be matched in pairs: 
each principle always corresponds with a political institution. The principles will be 
discussed first because they are established prior to the institutions and determine 
their function.
2.1. The principles of federalism
Federalism itself is a principle of government. It is a particularly complex pheno-
menon, therefore in order to fully understand its essence it must be analyzed with 
the assistance of the other principles it comprises.12 This catalogue may be more or 
less detailed depending on the research methodology adopted and what one seeks to 
prove; and not the presentation of the issue. I will discuss below the most important 
principles, from the perspective of the political system, that are present in federal 
political systems. The distribution of competence is a very complex principle which 
is itself derived from other principles; it therefore must be examined in some detail 
and its origins explained. In contrast, the principle of participation does not need 
to be discussed at length because it is clearly illustrated by the institution of a lower 
house in a federal political system; this will be briefly discussed when we examine 
institutions.
2.1.1. The division of power and competence in a federal state. 
The principle of sovereignty and autonomy in a federal state
Besides the traditional (horizontal) division of power between the executive, legisla-
ture and judiciary in a federal state, there is also a vertical division of power, namely 
a division of competence in particular fields of political power between the federal 
level and the constituents’ levels. The division of competence between the constitu-
12 Some authors when discussing the phenomenon of federalism neglect the issue of values and in-
stitutions which are characteristic of this sort of political system: see, for example, W. Suchecki in 
his Teoria federalizmu; others present the principles of federalism in the form of a single catalogue 
and do not distinguish between them. For example, see F. Kinsky, who writes about the principles 
of federalism while describing its institutions. See F. Kinsky, Federalizm – model ogólnoeuropejski, 
trans. by B. Harasimowicz, M. Harasimowicz, Kraków 1999, pp. 50-58.
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ents of a federation and the federation itself should be regarded as being the most 
essential and most important of all the federal principles. This division determines 
the character of the federalism in particular states. As Weber noted, by examining 
the division of competence one can presume the future development of a federal sys-
tem – whether it tends towards centralization or, on the contrary, towards a further 
strengthening of the constituents of the federation. In this context the division of 
competence indicates the political position of the constituent states in the federation. 
In the classical concept of a federal state, the division of competence is supposed to 
secure the interests of constituent states.13 This is how it is supposed to be in theory; 
reality, however – as has already been noted – is subject to permanent change, both 
qualitative and quantitative.
Now the article will turn to the issue of justification of the vertical division of 
power. This issue is strictly linked to the problem of sovereignty in a federal state. 
Some authors pay a great deal of attention to this problem.14 Others neglect this issue 
and substitute the term ‘sovereignty’ with that of ‘autonomy.’15
The problem of sovereignty – despite not being the most important when dis-
cussing federalism – should not be neglected. Sczaniecki has written: ‘There is a dis-
pute with regard to whether sovereignty is vested in a federation or also in the con-
stituent states. According to international law sovereignty belongs generally only 
to a federation, and in a confederation to the confederated states. The issue raises 
questions because no fixed line exists between a federation and a confederation and 
it causes serious difficulties when it comes to deciding what kind of union should be 
formed between states.’16 He points out that we also encounter terminological con-
fusion with regard to complex states, like, for example Switzerland, which is a federa-
tion but presents itself officially as a confederation.17
A research problem appears at the very outset. Like in the case of a federation 
there is no single definition of the concept of sovereignty.18 Generally speaking, sov-
ereignty is a feature of the state which consists of its exclusive power and independ-
ence namely the ability of its legal structures to take independent decisions covering 
13 K. Weber, Kriterien des Bundesstaates. Eine systematische, historische und rechtsvergleichende 
Untersuchung der Bundesstaatlichkeit der Schweiz, der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Österreichs, 
Wien 1980, p. 90.
14 W. Suchecki begins his book that examines the theory of federalism with a discussion of this issue 
and regard, as it is essential for further consideration. See W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, ch. I.
15 See F. Kinsky, Federalizm…, pp. 50-51.
16 M. Sczaniecki, Powszechna historia…, p. 521.
17 Ibid., p. 521. The full name is the Confederation of Switzerland. Additional terminological confu-
sion is introduced by the name of its constitution – The Federal Constitution of the Confederation 
of Switzerland.
18 The presentation of the historical evolution of the concept of sovereignty is not the purpose of 
this article, so I confine myself to presenting the relationship between this concept and the general 
theory of federalism. For more information about the concept of sovereignty in a federal state, see 
W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, p. 55.
This content downloaded from 
            149.156.234.28 on Fri, 16 Oct 2020 10:46:31 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
421POLITEJA 2/1(10/1)/2008 The Theory of Federalism…
all matters on its entire territory. Sovereignty is also the state’s ability to exist as an in-
dependent entity in international relations.19 This short presentation tells us nothing 
about the concept of sovereignty in a federal state. It should also be noted that there 
is no established paradigm among researchers in terms of the character of sovereignty 
in a federal state. Some believe that sovereignty is vested in both the federal state and 
its constituents; others assume that only a federal state is sovereign and deny that its 
constituent states possess this quality.
The concept of sovereignty would become useful in the context of federal state 
theory if we could define its content in a more detailed way. Sovereignty can be di-
vided into two types: legal and political. The former relates to the government which 
enacts and establishes laws; the latter is connected with the ability to influence the 
government’s decision-making process, for example through elections. The precise 
division of sovereignty into legal and political parts can be found, for the most part, 
in a constitution. Suchecki emphasises the fact that this division is important when 
we try to understand in what way political sovereignty does influences the forming 
of the legal sovereignty in a federal state.20
The next significant division is that between internal and external sovereignty. It 
relates to the above mentioned features of sovereignty, namely exclusive power which 
is internal sovereignty, and independence which is external sovereignty. According to 
some theories states after joining a federation loose their external sovereignty while 
preserving their internal sovereignty.21
Reflections on the concept of sovereignty are not overly important here. What is 
important is to find some answers to the question as to which side possesses sovereign-
ty; in other words, who is the bearer of sovereignty in a federation. Researches have 
been discussing this issue from the moment federal states came into existence. Some 
authors pay attention to the fact that a federation is a union of states; that is, a union 
of sovereign entities that do not loose their sovereignty when agreeing to a union but 
only consent to some limitations. According to this conception, a federal state is a sort 
of confederation that emerges as a result of a voluntary agreement between states. This 
agreement, as well as the federation, should help when it comes to conducting certain 
tasks both in the spheres of foreign policy and internal policy, although some limita-
tions apply to the latter. Some other researchers go even further and assert that – from 
the legal point of view – there is no such thing as a federal state, and therefore it can-
not possess sovereignty.22 These concepts originated out of a need for increasing the 
degree of decentralization in newly established federations during the nineteenth cen-
tury in the United States and Germany, and also, in later periods, in other states.
19 G. Michałowska (ed.), Mały słownik stosunków międzynarodowych, Warszawa 1996, pp. 239-240.
20 W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, p. 55.
21 Ibid., p. 60.
22 This position was defended by M. Seydel, see M. Seydel, ‘Der Bundesstaatsbegriff ’, Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 1872, p. 198. According to W. Suchecki, his views were disregarded 
because it did not correspond with the facts. See W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, p. 164.
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Obviously, there are conceptions quite contrary to those presented above which 
assume that sovereignty is a feature that belongs solely to a federal state. They presup-
pose that the central government is superior to the governments of the constituent 
states. From this fact follows another conclusion: that the constituent states are not 
sovereign but only autonomous in regard to certain legal competences.23 Jellinek’s 
conception is one of the best known and it links sovereignty to the exercising of 
government power. He believes that only the federal state is sovereign. Constituent 
states possess partial sovereignty in the form of the possibility of performing some 
governmental tasks that have been clearly delegated to them by the constitution.24 
The government of a federation is the limit of this delegated power. In order to avoid 
blurring the differences between the constituent states and any levels of administra-
tive division in a unitary state, these conceptions indicate that the constituent states 
participate in the process of federal law-making, especially through the lower houses 
of parliament.25
Both the above mentioned ways of thinking about sovereignty in a federal state 
represent extreme positions. The first concept gives voice to particularism and comes 
closer to the confederalistic concepts than to the theory of the federal state. The sec-
ond concept represents a centralistic way of thinking about federalism which aims 
to centralize federal states. As we have mentioned before, federalism is not an easily 
definable phenomenon. The same can be said of the issue of sovereignty in a federal 
state. Apart from those concepts that have already been discussed there is also a third 
one. It is the concept of the sharing of sovereignty within a federation.
According to its premises, sovereignty is divisible because the tasks of a federal 
state are also divisible. All the entities contained within a federation, namely the con-
stituent states and the federal state itself, have their own tasks which are performed 
separately. Both kinds of entities possess their own political and legal systems.26
To summarize the issues concerning sovereignty in a federal state we need to note 
that the choice of conception is dependent upon the formulated goals. Federalists 
will tend to endow sovereignty to the constituent states, whereas unitarists will be 
inclined to conceive of sovereignty as being vested only in a federation. The popular-
ity of both theories has been largely dependent upon historical circumstances. The 
former conception became more popular at the beginning of the federal era because 
the constituent states were afraid of being absorbed into federal states. When the 
times changed the latter conception gained more support.
23 Ibid., p. 166.
24 G. Jellinek, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen, Berlin 1882, p. 770. On other conceptions that 
treat the federal state as the only sovereign entity see W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, pp. 165-166 
and K. Weber, Kriterien des Bundesstaates…, pp. 68-70.
25 W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, p. 172.
26 W. Suchecki believes that this concept, proposed in German science by G. Weitz, did not find many 
followers because the division of sovereignty came to be seen as a political postulate and not a legal 
issue. See ibid., p. 176. Despite these reservations this theory should not be dismissed because fed-
eralism and the federal state are not only legal, but mainly ‘political’ phenomena.
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But it now seems that neither of them has been implemented in its pure form 
in the political and legal practices of federal states. Constituent states of the fed-
eration are not entities in the sense of international law, but they are often al-
lowed to conduct their own independent foreign policy in certain specified areas, 
even though they cannot be regarded as being sovereign. However, they have the 
right of self-determination and a state-like system of governmental institutions. 
Kinsky’s view would appear to be justified when he states that the constituent 
states of a federation are autonomous and we should therefore skip over the issue 
of sovereignty.27
In order to eliminate the troublesome issue of sovereignty in federal states we 
can substitute it with the concept of political power which – if we consider the fact 
that the nation is sovereign – seems both logical and practical. There is no single and 
definite pattern when it comes to the division of competences in a federal state. In 
each case it depends upon the political situation at the time of settling these matters; 
that is, at the moment of enacting the constitution and in the period following, as 
well as upon the political forces in a particular federal state. In addition, the division 
of competence between the constituents and the federation has the characteristics 
of a process, namely it is subject to permanent change that results in the shifting of 
competences between the entities mentioned above or the delegation to them of new 
tasks.
In a federal state the division of competence is usually regulated by a federal con-
stitution. Now we will consider the issue of competence of competence (in German, 
Kompetenzkompetenz); that is, the right to establish a division of competence between 
the entities of a federation. This right is usually vested in a federation.28 Suchecki 
writes that the division of competence may be arbitrarily established by a federation 
without the consent of the constituent states.29 As far as we can theoretically con-
ceive of such a situation, it should be noted that this concerns undemocratic states in 
which even the basic principle of federalism has not been fully realized.
Federal constitutions differ in terms of the division of competence between the 
federation and constituent states. A constitution may enumerate them in detail. 
Such a solution has its advantages: for example, it eliminates competence disputes, 
but in turn it needs to be modified frequently in order to adjust the law to the ever-
changing legal and political reality. The general division of competence is another 
possibility. This solution frees the legislature from making frequent changes in the 
constitution, which is particularly advantageous for the stability of the system, but 
carries an inherent risk that competence disputes between various institutions on 
many levels may break out.
27 F. Kinsky, Federalizm…, pp. 50-51.
28 K. Weber writes with regard to this issue that the decision concerning the division of compe-
tence belongs to the federation, but member states possess the material abilities to influence the 
changes.
29 W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, p. 223.
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The exchange of competences and the granting of them to a particular entity – 
a federation or a constituent state – is another issue. In this case there are also various 
possibilities.30 A catalogue that enumerates the competences of a federation is one of 
the most known and popular solutions. A federation’s competence must be precisely 
specified in the constitution, while all other matters not included in this catalogue 
are in the competence of the constituent states.31 The presumption of competence 
constitutes the principle that is involved here.32 The system of competitive compe-
tence (which is present in the German political system) assumes that if we deal with 
competences that have not been explicitly granted either to the federal state or to the 
constituent states (lands), these competences are vested in Länder until otherwise de-
cided by the federation.33
The division of competence relates to the principle of the legal and political equal-
ity of the constituent states. This principle may sometimes be impaired. A horizontal 
division of competence between particular constituent states may occur when one of 
them reserves special rights for itself.34
The division of competence between the entities of a federation requires a deci-
sion as to what institutions are needed and in what way they will exercise their pow-
ers. During the period in which the first federal states were established, their gov-
ernments did not possess exclusive administrative systems, and therefore, in order to 
exercise their competences, they had to use the administrative systems of their con-
stituent states. This was the case in the German Reich from 1871 onwards. Granting 
control of the regional administration to federal civil servants is another solution to 
this problem. In some cases, it presupposes the use of federal administrative institu-
tions; in others, those of the constituent states.35
The division of competence in a federal state is a vitally important issue. It de-
termines the character of the federal system and the lines of its development. It is 
a point of departure for all further reflection on this phenomena and research into 
particular federal systems. At this point it should be emphasised again that the cata-
logue of competences has not been established once and for all and it is subject to 
constant change. Federal constitutions usually grant to the federation the following 
competences: foreign policy, defence, financial policy and the highest levels of the 
judiciary.36
30 Undemocratic states that have a federal structure include the Soviet Union and the German 
Democratic Republic until 1952.
31 On other possible divisions of competence in federal constitutions see Suchecki. He gives examples 
of South Africa and the Dominion of Canada which enumerated both the competences of the fed-
eration and the competences of the constituent states, while the all remaining issues were subject to 
federal regulations. W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, pp. 232-237.
32 K. Weber, Kriterien des Bundesstaates…, p. 91.
33 F. Kinsky, Federalizm…, p. 56.
34 W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, p. 240.
35 Ibid., p. 242.
36 F. Kinsky, Federalizm…, p. 55.
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2.1.2. Participation
The participation or engagement of the constituent states when it comes to decision-
making pertaining to matters of state is another feature that is characteristic of fede-
ral political systems. This principle is discussed here because it supports a concrete fe-
deral institution, and, as was mentioned before, every federal institution is backed by 
one of the federal principles formed prior to it. This is equally true of participation. 
This principle is realized in a federal state through a second house of parliament. It 
is worth noting that the problem of the participation of constituent states in matters 
concerning the entire federation is much more complex and cannot be confined to 
the existence and work of the second house.
The principle of participation is connected to the above mentioned issue of sover-
eignty in a federal state. The constituent states of a federation are treated as political 
entities which, like citizens, should have political representation at the federal level in 
order to allow them to present their views on all substantial matters relating to them 
or to the whole federation.
The constituent states’ level of participation in matters concerning the federation 
varies in each particular case. Both history and current politics are among the determi-
nants of this issue. In federal states where federalism has been established as a result of 
a bottom-up process that involved small communities, as in Switzerland, the level of 
participation of constituent states is high. It can be seen not only in the participation 
of particular states’ representatives in the work of the upper house of parliament but 
also when it comes to appointing the members of the government.37 In states where 
federalism came into being as a result of a compromise between centralistic tendencies 
which very often were in a stronger political and economic position (as in Prussia in 
the nineteenth century) and the real need and the will to unify (on equal conditions) 
expressed by other states, the constituent states may influence the whole federation by 
a legislative procedure, as well as by appointing members of the executive. The latter is 
of rather symbolic significance because it relates to the election of a federal president 
whose function is purely ceremonial.38
The lowest level of participation of constituent states can be encountered in those fed-
eral states in which federalism itself was born out of a political need,39 or as a result of the 
central government’s attempt to pacify emerging separatists, as in the case of Austria. The 
participation of constituent states in matters concerning the whole federation is more dif-
ficult under these circumstances and it manifests itself mainly in the fact of the existence 
of the second house of parliament in which their representatives sit. The powers of this 
37 Ibid., p. 57.
38 Ibid.
39 Soviet federalism is an example of federalism that was ‘politically commissioned’, without giving 
any real powers to the member states. On Soviet federalism see W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, 
passim.
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house are limited and it cannot effectively oppose the lower house which represents the 
interests of the entire federation and very often tends towards centralization.
The participation of the constituent states may also take other, less formalized 
shapes. Constituent states can work out a common position on matters concerning the 
entire federation and then present it at the federal level or to public opinion, and in 
that way seek to advance their interests. In contemporary states, not only among feder-
al, but also among unitary states with a decentralized structure there has been a struggle 
between the federal or central government and the constituent states or administrative 
units. Depending on circumstances, one of these levels of government will prevail. This 
issue is connected with the above mentioned problem of participation because a politi-
cal system that tends towards centralization may impair the degree of participation or 
even eliminate it. In such an eventuality, it is hard to talk in terms of a federal system. 
Hence we can draw the conclusion that the participation of constituent states is one of 
the essential principles of federalism.
2.2. The institutions of federalism
Federal institutions are the derivatives of the principles presented above. A political 
institution is not only a group of people, or an organized political actor having at its 
disposal the ways and means to participate in political life.40 It is also a set of rules 
of law relating to a particular political activity.41 In discussing selected federal insti-
tutions both types of institution will be examined, namely an institution conceived 
as a concrete body and an institution conceived as a set of rules that regulate certain 
activities. As in the case of federal principles we will discuss only a few federal institu-
tions. Firstly, the federal constitution will be examined. Secondly, we will focus on the 
institution and the functions of the second house in a federal political system. Thirdly, 
federal financial policy will be discussed. Putting financial policy into the catalogue of 
federal institutions may lead to objections; nevertheless, it is one of the most impor-
tant institutions and it facilitates the correct workings of the federal system.
2.2.1. The constitution of a federal state
In addition to its traditional functions, a federal constitution is the guarantor of a fe-
deral system. Suchecki writes that the tasks set by a federal constitution are incom-
parably more complex that those of unitary state.42 It is hard to disagree with this 
statement. A federal constitution usually originates in a quite specific set of circum-
stances.43 States that decide to establish a federation seek to secure as many of their 
40 For this definition see A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut (eds.), Leksykon politologii, Wrocław 2000, 
p. 180.
41 Ibid.
42 W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, p. 304.
43 It relates to the issue of the passing of the first federal constitution in particular states.
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own interests as possible, but simultaneously a new entity – the federation – claims 
its own rights. The problem of reconciling various tendencies in order to ensure that 
the federation functions effectively is the goal of a constitution.
It has been argued that only a written constitution may be the guarantor of pre-
serving and respecting the rights of the constituent states.44 This opinion is not con-
troversial since federal constitutions were often established as a result of international 
agreements between various entities and took the form of written documents.
A federal constitution outlines the division of competence between the federation 
and its constituent states and because of this very fact it is the most important of all 
the federal institutions. However, its tasks extend far beyond this. When competence 
disputes need to be dealt with, it settles who is entitled to make the decision or re-
solve a particular problem.
A federal constitution determines in detail the procedure of changing the consti-
tution. It is usually quite complicated and requires wide consent. It differs depend-
ing on the state but there is a general rule that a change in the constitution must be 
agreed to by the majority of both the lower house and the second house, as well as by 
the people, or by a qualified majority of the constituent states’ parliaments. It is also 
true that there are federal constitutions that may be modified by an act of parliament 
that requires some form of qualified parliamentary majority.45
Despite these specific precautionary measures which aim to secure the rights and 
interests of constituent states, we cannot exclude the possibility that gradually they 
may become marginalized and that the system may acquire a centralized form of 
government. In federal states there has always been competition between the central 
government connected with the federal authority and the constituent states. Each 
has sought to increase its powers and competences at the expense of the other. The 
new tasks that modern states have to fulfil and the apparent domination of a federa-
tion at the administrative level of the federal state, has made federal governments 
more significant in recent times. It was also been affected by the changes to constitu-
tions which have granted more rights to the federation.
A federal constitution also performs some other functions. One of them is to 
guarantee the compatibility with all other acts of law passed by the constituent states, 
as well as the requirement on the part of the constituent states to be compatible with 
the federal constitution. Despite the fact that in a federal state two legal orders co-
exist (the federal and that of the constituent states) there is certainty that in terms of 
the political system they will be compatible.
2.2.2. The second house of parliament in a federal political system
Zwierzchwski has pointed out that in a federal state we have to deal with dual re-
presentation at the federal level. Besides the body that represents the sovereign – the 
44 This position is presented by W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, p. 304.
45 This procedure is in force in Austria.
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nation as a whole – there is another body that represents the constituent parts of the 
federation.46
As has been mentioned before, the institution of the second house in a federal sys-
tem is the main expression of the constituent states’ participation in the federal struc-
ture and an instrument for influencing overall federal policy. The very existence of the 
second houses of parliament, as well as their right to co-decide all essential public mat-
ters, are usually regarded as being a quintessential part of federal political systems.
The second house – traditionally called the upper house – was originally the first 
house. It was only the rise of democracy and the popularization of universal suffrage, as 
well as the fact that decisions were transferred to the lower house (which also exercises po-
litical control over the government) that has changed the position of both houses, which 
may be visible in a new nomenclature regarding the various parts of the parliament.47
Second houses can be encountered in both federal and unitary states.48 The legiti-
macy of their existence and their function in federal states has as its basis the necessity 
of representing constituent states’ interests. The genesis of second houses in federal 
states should be linked to the very beginning of the federation, when independent en-
tities decided to engage in co-operation, and subsequently came to renounce some of 
their powers in favour of the newly created entity, namely the federal state. Constituent 
states have not always easily agreed to the qualitative change that would lead to a loss of 
some powers. The establishment of a body that would represent their interests and al-
low for the exchange of their opinions may be viewed as a form of compensation. The 
recognition of second houses may be illustrated by the fact that both houses are consti-
tutionally of equal rank. Second houses, like lower houses, participate in the legislative 
process and in the shaping of the political system.49
The representation of constituent states’ interests is the basic reason for the exist-
ence of second houses in federal states. We should now turn to discussing the proc-
ess of electing members of both houses because it somehow helps to determine their 
character.
In regard to this point there are various possibilities. Weber discerned three basic 
types.50 First, there is the system of the federal council in which members are elected 
by local assemblies or are even identical to them. This is a very pragmatic solution, 
46 E. Zwierzchowski (ed.), Izby drugie parlamentu, Białystok 1996, p. 13.
47 The change in the position of both houses is discussed by Weber. See K. Weber, Kriterien des 
Bundesstaates…, p. 127. See also E. Zwierzchowski in his book on second houses. E. Zwierzchowski 
(ed.), Izby drugie…, p. 7.
48 The second houses in unitary states have not only a different legitimization of their function but 
also possess a different range of competences than those in federal states. For more information see 
E. Zwierzchowski (ed.), Izby drugie…, passim and J. Szymanek, Izby drugie parlamentu w procesie 
ustawodawczym, Warszawa 1999, passim.
49 E. Zwierzchowski (ed.), Izby drugie…, p. 13. This is a formal approach, federal practices vary. 
K. Weber writes that the competences of a second house in a federal state are rarely counterbalanced 
by the competences of a lower house. See K. Weber, Kriterien des Bundesstaates…, p. 127. The posi-
tion of the second house in Switzerland is radically different from that in Austria.
50 K. Weber, Kriterien des Bundesstaates…, p. 128.
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one that subordinates the second house to the executives of the constituent states. 
The advantage of this solution lies in the fact that it allows day-to-day politics to be 
effectively bypassed, and therefore improves the quality of the debates, which can 
now pay more attention to concrete or even technical issues.
The second model is a system of the Senate. The deputies of the second house 
are elected in universal elections. The constituent states are in these cases usually the 
same as the constituencies. On the one hand, this solution strengthens the relation-
ship between voters and deputies; but on the other hand, it may have a negative im-
pact on the representation of constituent states’ interests in the second house since it 
leads to political and partisan divisions.
The last type proposed by the above mentioned researcher is a model of the sec-
ond house that consists of members elected by the state parliaments. This system, 
like the previous one, is strongly dependent upon a party system which, unfortunate-
ly, does not help to represent the constituent states’ interests and makes – through 
party instructions – the second house dependent on the lower house. Instead of rep-
resenting local interests, the deputies represent political factions.
Zwierzchowski adds one more type of electoral system to the second house in 
which deputies are nominated by the prime minister in response to the applications 
of local communities.51
Regardless of the electoral systems, the role of second houses in the political sys-
tem of a federal state cannot be disregarded. The position of the second house in the 
system of government has been constantly evolving. Originally it was the dominant 
body but over the course of time its position has diminished, and now in all federal 
states there is some discussion as to whether to reform this body in order to re-estab-
lish its primary function of representing the constituent states’ interests, as well as to 
improve its work. Whatever the results of these discussions, second houses will still 
remain institutions that actualize one of the most important principles of federalism; 
that is, participation.
2.2.3. Financial policy in a federal state
Financial policy is one of the key issues when discussing problems connected with 
the theory of a federal state. Many authors used to neglect this issue, paying attention 
solely to the issues of the political system. It should be remembered that all regula-
tions concerning the division of competence, participation etc., without an adequate 
financial policy, probably would be wholly ineffective. For this very reason, financial 
policy should be regarded as a federal institution. By skilfully influencing this policy 
one can truly influence the form of federalism in each particular state.
In the German language financial policy is derived form the term financial com-
pensation – Finanzausgleich. This term was introduced as early as the late nineteenth 
51 E. Zwierzchowski (ed.), Izby drugie…, p. 14. This system of electing the second house is in force in 
Canada.
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century in Switzerland in order to describe the financial relations between the federa-
tion and the cantons.52 Since then, it has become popularized and is now used also 
in Germany and Austria for the overall financial policy concerning the regulations 
between the federation and the constituent states.
Financial policy in a federal state is derived from the principle of the division of 
competence between the entities of the federation and the principle of the participa-
tion of the constituent states. Kinsky has written that the autonomy of constituent 
states must be guaranteed not only by a constitution but must also be supported with 
appropriate funds.53
If we assume that there exists a division of tasks in the federal state and we high-
light the entities responsible for performing them – either constituent states or a fed-
eration – we must also indicate the source of financing. So when discussing issues 
concerning financial policy in a federal state we have to keep on mind three cat-
egories: the division of tasks, the division of expenditures and the accumulation of 
revenues.54
The main aim of financial policy is to distribute resources in such a way that will 
allow all the entities of the federation to perform equally their tasks.
From this we can draw a conclusion that financial policy should regulate not 
only the vertical flow of money between the federation and the constituent states, 
but that it is also supposed to secure an appropriate flow of money between par-
ticular constituent states. The federal constitutions also guarantee an equal tempo 
of development as well as equal access to the welfare state for all citizens regardless 
of what constituent state they inhabit. However, it is quite obvious that economic 
development will vary depending on the region, which may limit the access of citi-
zens to goods, both material and symbolic. This would suggest that financial policy 
has its place, because of its ability to form and influence. A good financial policy 
in a federal state seeks to level the differences that result from unequal economic 
development.55
Managing financial policy is not a simple task. Many structural problems may 
resurface during its implementation. Firstly a division of expenditures between 
the federation and the constituent states should be specified and allotted. It is 
then necessary to establish a system that protects citizens against double taxation. 
Finally, financial abilities as well as the needs of the constituent states should be 
assessed.56
Weber pointed out three possible variations when it comes to conducting 
financial policy in a federal state. The first is a system of separation. It presup-
52 K. Weber, Kriterien des Bundesstaates…, p. 171.
53 F. Kinsky, Federalizm…, p. 51.
54 K. Weber, Kriterien des Bundesstaates…, p. 172.
55 These differences are not necessarily the structural results of bad state policy; they may arise from 
different geographical or economical conditions of particular member states.
56 K. Weber, Kriterien des Bundesstaates…, p. 173.
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poses that each entity of the federation decides separately about the sources of 
financing and taxes. This solution inevitably leads to double taxation and as such 
it does not exist in a pure form in any federal state. There is also an attenuated 
version of this variant in which all the entities within the federation conduct 
consultations in order to avoid double taxation. The joint system is another vari-
ant. In this system the right to determine the sources of revenue belongs only to 
one entity of the federation – the union, the lands or even counties.57 The last 
variant is a mixed system. It brings together the features of separate and joint 
systems. Particular entities within the federation can use their own financial 
sources, as well as those transferred from other entities. It seems that this is the 
optimal system because it gives independence to the constituent states in finan-
cial matters and it simultaneously secures them against huge discrepancies in 
public spending.58
Financial policy in a federal state is firmly connected to the exercising of com-
petence by particular entities. It was shaped originally in that way in order to se-
cure enough funds for the realization of shared tasks conducted by the federation. 
Over the course of time the situation completely changed and constituent states 
became forced to seek funds for financing their own policy. Along with the devel-
opment of federal states and the increase of tasks performed by the union, constit-
uent states became increasingly dependent on the financial policy of the federation 
because it makes decisions regarding taxation. It sometimes also happens that taxes 
collected at lower levels – in the constituent states or counties – are transferred to 
the centre and are then redistributed. This situation also has some advantages in 
that it allows a federal state to increase the rate of development of particular re-
gions and to care equally for all citizens.
3. THE CLASSIFICATION OF FEDERAL STATES
As has been already mentioned at the beginning, there is no single and coherent the-
ory of federalism, nor is there a single type of federal state. When constructing typo-
logies of federal states various factors must be taken into account. Their shape hinges 
on the researcher’s intention or goal. Two typologies of federal states will be discussed 
below. One focuses on the genesis of a federal state, and the other analyses in detail 
the relations between the particular entities of a federation.
3.1. The division of federal states in relation to their genesis
The genesis of a federal state has a vital influence on its future development. It de-
termines to a large extent the division of competence between the constituent states 
57 K. Weber enumerates different variants of this system. See ibid., p. 174.
58 Ibid., pp. 173-174.
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and the federation. Suchecki mentions several possible ways in which federal states 
can be established.59
Concluding an agreement between independent entities, not necessarily states, 
is the first possibility.60 Another possibility is to establish a federal state through an 
agreement between sovereign states that were previously parts of a unitary state. In 
this case, before a new federal state can emerge the old unitary state must be dis-
solved, very often as a consequence of decentralization. This solution may help to 
prevent the fragmentation of the state or strivings for secession. In such cases, feder-
alization is the only way of saving the state.
Another similar way of establishing a federation is to give territorial units the 
status of constituent states through a constitution. The central government plays 
a major role in this process, which implements this solution as an act of its own in-
dependent will.
Another possibility occurs when a federation is established by entities that previ-
ously were under the influence of a colonial power and then gained independence. 
These entities were not previously sovereign states, hence we can conclude that seces-
sion occurred and a new entity was created.
The next possibility presupposes turning a confederation into a federation. This 
process changes the status of these political systems. In this case, sovereign entities 
become member states of a federation and give up some of their sovereign rights. 
They accept the creation of a sovereign authority that will make decisions which 
concern the entire new entity, according to the principle of majority rule, including 
those constituent states which do not agree with some of the solutions.
The possibilities mentioned above are some general types. They have all played 
a role in the genesis of many federal states. This does not mean, however, that this 
typology is anything more than a helpful instrument when it comes to analysing the 
division of competence and relations between entities in federal states.
3.2. The division of federal states according to the type of relationship 
between the union and member states
These relations, despite the fact that they are regulated by federal constitutions, very 
often acquire a different shape than was originally conceived by the founders of the 
federation. The progress of civilization and the changes it brings about when it co-
mes to perceiving the function and role of state has caused the emergence of new at-
tempts at regulating these relations. Sometimes they will take an institutional form, 
sometimes they remain within the area of agreement between the entities of the fe-
deration; in addition, there are various projects which seek to build these relations. 
Now we will present three models of federalism.
59 W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, pp. 248-249.
60 These might be counties or territorial communities, as in the case of Switzerland.
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3.2.1. Functional federalism
Sarnecki distinguishes the concept of executive federalism from functional federa-
lism, writing that in the model of executive federalism the function of federal agen-
cies is limited to administrative activities, excluding the judiciary61.
The most important feature of functional federalism is the separation of tasks 
between the entities of the federation in relation to the functions they perform and 
not with regard to the division of matters.62 The federation takes over almost all the 
tasks relating to the enactment of laws while constituent states are responsible for 
implementing them.
The term executive federalism can be justified in another way. It suggests that the 
entities are the major actors responsible for realizing federal policy. In such a model 
– which adopts such a division of tasks – the constituent states become the active 
participants of this policy. They take over some tasks which formerly belonged to the 
parliaments of member states.
Functional federalism assumes the necessity of co-operation between the entities 
of the federation and requires that they make compromises in order to smoothly im-
plement the laws passed by the union. It is worth mentioning that the latter entities 
are not completely devoid of influence when it comes to shaping the law that they 
must implement, because in the legislative process at the federal level they have their 
representatives who sit in the second house of parliament.
3.2.2. Dualistic federalism
This model is characteristic of the solutions adopted in the United States.63 The mo-
del of dualistic federalism assumes the existence of two parallel legal systems and go-
vernment branches, as well as dual citizenship. In contrast to the above mentioned 
model of functional federalism, this model divides matters relating to the legislative 
power of the federation and the member states. Both types of entities possess their 
own executive and judiciary, which guarantee the implementation and the observan-
ce of laws.64 This model assures the mutual independence of entities in regard to the 
tasks that have been allotted to them.
61 P. Sarnecki, Ustroje konstytucyjne państw współczesnych, Kraków 2003, pp. 204-205. It should 
be noted that in the professional German literature the dominant term is ‘executive federalism’ 
(Exekutivföderalismus).
62 Ibid., p. 204.
63 Generally speaking it should be noted that on a theoretical plane each federal system is dualistic 
because ‘duality’ is one of the features of federalism. This theory in its pure form remains only a the-
ory, and legal and political practice derive from other solutions, as is the case in the United States.
64 W. Suchecki, Teoria federalizmu, p. 188.
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3.2.3. Co-operative federalism
This theory of federalism was developed after the Second World War. It is a response 
to the developing forms of co-operation between the particular entities of the federa-
tion – both vertical and horizontal. Numerous relationships between the interests of 
the federation and the constituent states were emphasized.65 It became obvious that 
the dualistic theory of federalism does not correspond with political practice. Many 
tasks of the modern state may be carried out only through the common initiative of 
all entities. Weber points to the fact that the co-operation of various entities is a con-
stitutive feature of a co-operative federalism.66 Co-operative federalism comprises all 
levels of power.
Co-operative federalism blurs all differences in relation to the division of com-
petence between a federation and member states focusing on the concrete forms of 
co-operation between various entities. Co-operative federalism facilitates the realiza-
tion of many tasks, although it may also lead to the financial dependence of member 
states on the federation. Despite the latter qualification, it seems that nowadays there 
is no repulsion from this form of federalism due to the fact that it guarantees that the 
basic tasks of the state will be performed and that various entities will be involved 
when it comes to fulfilling them.
4. SUMMARY
The theoretical analysis of federalism and the federal state that has been presented 
above obviously does not exhaust the subject-matter. The issues discussed should 
help the reader to better understand the phenomena in question and explain some 
of the concepts. It will also be a useful guide for analyzing the federal systems of par-
ticular states.
Translated by Arkadiusz Górnisiewicz
65 Ibid., p. 189.
66 K. Weber, Kriterien des Bundesstaates…, p. 226.
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